Pettit on Contestability

The more I read Pettit, the more I think I will have to start saying I am a civic republican - we will see where he ends up, but the idea that has got me at the moment is his focus on contestability rather than consent.

This distinction comes up in his discussion of what can make government interference non-arbitrary - and therefore justified. Government interference in this case consists mainly of laws (possibly completely considering his emphasis on the rule of law). The typical liberal account calls on consent, either actual (the people actually agree with the laws) or hypothetical (we suppose that rational individuals would agree with the laws). Pettit suggests that what makes action by the state non-arbitrary is contestability rather than consent. The justification of law is not based on whether people actually do agree with those laws or if we can rationally assume that they would agree, but if there is the space, capacity, and structure that allows for contestability - and the government must be responsive to these contestations.

There is not space to go into it here, but this seems to relate very closely to an argument that I have made (in a course paper) about one of Rawl's conditions for a being a "decent hierarchical people" (from the Law of Peoples). I argued in that paper that for a society to be decent, Rawls claims that they must have an institutional mechanism that allows for voices from all sectors of society to be heard - and responded to with respect - even if they are not a part of the formal decision making structure.

Pettit calls on a picture of individual autonomy to illuminate his conception of contestability. He defines autonomy as the capability to expose beliefs and desires to appropriate tests rather than reflective endorsement of all of one's beliefs (a position commonly framed as the liberal conception of autonomy). This too is something that sounds familiar. In a paper I presented at the Social Philosophy Conference, I argued for a similar perspective on autonomy based in the philosophy of the pragmatists Peirce and Dewey (this is why I feel that I will have to start identifying as a civic republican). Pettit uses his picture of personal autonomy as an analogy for self-rule at the level of the state. Just as the individual must be able to submit their beliefs to the appropriate tests at any time, the decisions of the democratic state must be open to contestation from any sector of society and the state must respond and change if appropriate.

These conditions will make strong demands on the republican citizen - they must have the skills and dispositions to engage in contestation with the state whenever appropriate. - But for the moment this is speculation on my part about Pettit's direction in terms of what will be required of the citizen.

Pettit, P. (1999). Republicanism. Oxford University Press.

Pupik Dean, C. (2009, July). Balancing Culture and Autonomy: A Pragmatic Perspective. Presented at the International Social Philosophy Conference, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia.

Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples ; with, "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited". Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.